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Kenya's 1997

Making Sense of the

Elections

Transition Process

Rok Ajulu

The transition process in Kenya appears to be getting nowhere. Six years after the
opening of democratic space, politics, political institutions, and governance remain predominantly stuck in the authoritarian quagmire of the past. Lack of
broader participation in decision-making processes and absence of consensus

around important issues of governance appear to be the norm rather than the exception. Indeed, Kenya's democracy experiment appears to defy conventional democratization models and discourse. It refuses to comply with prescriptive models
developed by various Western scholars as the so-called liberal democratic values
stubbornly refuse to take root

in the country. This article

attempts to explain

why

part of a broader study that focuses on the political
economy of democratization in Kenya. The central thrust of the argument here is
this is the

case in Kenya.

It is

that in order to understand the crisis of democratization in Kenya, there

focus on the political economy of accumulation, particularly on
mediated politically over the post-colonial period.
to

Polling

for the

Kenyan

how

is

it

a need

has been

election of 1997, the second since the advent of the 1922

"democracy experiment," began on December 29, and the electoral process was
finally completed throughout the country and a new government formed during the

week of January 1998, with fairly predictable results. President Daniel Arap Moi
was returned to office with 40.4 percent of the vote. Though Moi was still very much a
minority president, his performance was a marginal improvement over the 1992 election, when he scraped through with 36 percent. His party, the ruling Kenya African
National Union (KANU), did not acquit itself well either. It managed to win only 107
of the 210 contested parliamentary seats. Even with the additional six of the twelve
first

proportionately allocated nominated seats, the ruling party

still

lacked a comfortable

working majority.

Faced with a hopelessly divided opposition
and senior

officials

convincingly.

The

By

beginning of 1997, President

KANU's

Moi

winning the elections

entry into the political ring of the National Convention Council, the

reform movement under the leadership of
tive

at the

of the ruling party had banked on

its

executive, the National Convention Execu-

Committee, halfway through 1997, however, began

to

change the balance of forces.

movement had President Moi pinned against the wall, and
KANU was subsequently forced to make concessions to render the elections possible.
Following the KANU-initiated Inter-Party Parliamentary Group deal, in which minimal
July 1997 the reform

constitutional changes relaxed rules for the electoral process, elections finally took
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place, but not entirely in President

much

spent so

Moi's

favor.

As

a result,

some

argue, the president

time and energy securing the presidency that there was no time to attend

to the parliamentary seats.

The

a razor- thin majority in Parliament, a highly

result:

flawed process, and a pyrrhic victory for President

Moi was achieved

at a rather

high

price for the continued political stability of the country.

Background
Yet

all this

to the Election

could have been predicted long before the elections. Ever since

Moi was
made

pressured into conceding political space and embracing political pluralism, he
rather clear that democratization

multipartyism, he told a

BBC

1

from Western powers. In

was not

part of his broader agenda.

He had

it

accepted

television interviewer in 1992, because of the pressure

fact, the political

processes since the opening of democratic

space in 1991 have been about reversing rather than deepening the democratization
experiment. The lack of broader participation in decision-making processes and absence

of consensus around important issues of governance appear to be the most recognizable

trademarks of President Moi's regime.

imagine
its

that the

in

loss of control of state power. Indeed,

can be called

runup

to the

its

class interest.

It is

was always an exercise

It

regime was interested

not surprising, therefore, that developments in the
to the

briefly.

remained as divided as they had

parties

been over the previous four years. Numerous attempts

The

1992 period, which had pro-

Let us look at those events

result.

At the beginning of 1997 the opposition
dismally,

in

such an exercise would be contrary to what

1997 elections bore striking similarity

duced a similarly controversial

in political sophistry to

conducting an election which could result

to unite the opposition

had

failed

elusive search for a single opposition candidate against the incumbent

President Moi, a political exercise that had occupied the opposition over the entire period of the opening of the democratic space,

the time, therefore,
final term.

By

civil society

(NCEC)

Moi appeared

to

had yet

to

produce any tangible

be cruising comfortably to a

fifth

result.

At

and supposedly

midyear, however, the entry of the reform movement, the

amalgam of

groups under the leadership of the National Convention Executive Council

into the political ring

under the slogan

No Reforms No

Election began to

change the balance of forces.

The NCEC's

political mobilization,

which

Limuru Convention on
demanding
The turning point came on

started with the

constitutional reforms, culminated across the country in a series of rallies

fundamental reforms before an election could take place.
July 7,

Saba Saba Day, the anniversary of a memorable uprising

in the capital city seven

years earlier, which had signaled the beginning of the multiparty campaign.

confrontation between the state security apparatuses
the General Service Unit
students,

— and the opposition

dead and hundreds injured. 2

peace prayer

A

week

alliance left ten people,

later,

The

violent

— Moi's feared paramilitary

force,

most of them

the security forces again stormed a

main Anglican church, All Saints Cathedral, and left a prominent church leader and opposition activist, the Reverend Njoya, for dead. 3 The original
Saba Saba in 1990 had sparked an almost identical pattern when thousands of people
gathered at Kamkunji in Nairobi for a pro-democracy rally. 4
Hot on the heels of these events came the ethnic cleansing in Coast province. The
in Nairobi's

violence that had started as an ordinary criminal raid into the local Likoni police station, in

which several policemen were

killed, the
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armory broken

into,

guns and ammu-

and the police station burnt down, soon assumed

nition stolen,

few days

later,

the death

toll

had risen

dimensions.

political

to twenty, the attack spread into

A

Likoni and

Kwale districts, and it was increasingly targeted at up-country people. Furthermore, it
was beginning to emerge that these were no ordinary criminals, for the attackers targeted churches associated with displaced persons, predominantly up-country, that
noncoastal individuals, mainly Kikuyu and

Luo

either unable or unwilling to deal with the situation

into

its

second week with a reported death

close to

toll

is,

The government proved
decisively. As the violence moved

ethnic groups.

fifty,

and the government neither

able to stem the tide of rumors nor contain the violence, parallels began to be drawn

with the ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley province in the runup to the 1992 multiparty
elections.

Overnight the government lost the political initiative to a section of the opposition

and

within the National Convention Assembly. According to a report by the

its allies

Kenya Human Rights Commission, the government
elections until such a time as

it

had recaptured the

for a while considered postponing

political initiative

Convention Assembly, which throughout July and August of
sive.

5

Against

this

background the Coast Violence came

leashed by the state to achieve certain objectives.

One

to

that

from the National

year was on the offen-

be seen as a strategy un-

of these was to create an environ-

ment that would have served as a convenient pretext for declaring a state of emergency.
The other, of course, had to do with undermining the demographic strength of the
opposition parties in a number of constituencies in the Coast province in the runup to
the election. The large populations of the Luo, Kikuyu, and Luhya have often been
considered a crucial swing factor in the Coast electoral calculations.

It is

not surprising,

most observers of Kenyan politics saw in the Coast ethnic eruption a
repeat of the 1991-1992 ethnic cleansing, which engulfed the whole of the Rift Valley
province and sections of Nyanza and Western provinces. Clearly the Moi regime did not
therefore, that

intend to level the playing field. But the international outcry that followed the violent

scenes of confrontation in the

TV

Kenyan

capital of Nairobi, captured live

networks, ultimately forced President

Moi

to

concede

by international

to opposition

demands

for

constitutional reforms before the general elections.

This he did through setting up the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG), a

KANU platform

which had been designed

the opposition and

its allies in

to blunt the

impact of the reform agenda of

the National Convention Council.

Executive Committee saw this as a means "to cool the

fire raised

and by the demands of the country for electoral reform, and
the

Moi

re-election machine," 6 a feat that President

Moi

The Convention's
by the

in the

NCEC

action

process to legitimise

achieved with remarkable suc-

cess.

On

IPPG achieved a remarkable breakthrough: the Constitution was
Assembly in October and November 1 997 so as to render the
country a de jure multiparty democracy; the Public Order Act (Cap 56) was amended to
facilitate freedom of assembly; section 33 of the Constitution was amended so that
nominated members of Parliament (MPs) are proposed on a pro rata basis by all parliamentary parties with a minimum of seven MPs. More important, the electoral process
the surface, the

amended by

the National

was supposedly delinked from the
•

•

state apparatuses:

The Electoral Commission (EC) was mandated to manage the campaign
process without interference by the provincial administration.
The EC was to have powers to hire prosecutors to expedite the process
of election petition.
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The EC was

have powers

to

to

monitor

fair

coverage by Kenya Broad-

casting Corporation radio and television.

The IPPG thus made
say.

On

it

possible for President

the one hand, he

was able

seemingly legitimate his reelection machine.

demands of

Moi

two birds with one

to kill

to recapture the political initiative

On

the international donor community,

the other, he

which had

and threatened ungovernability and

was able

stone, so to

NCEC

and

to satisfy the

insisted on there being

NCEC

basic reforms (largely undefined), particularly after the

from

had taken

some

to the streets

political instability.

Moi made sure that the reform package remained
on paper. As the commission chairperson admitted two

In practice, however, President

impressive in practice than

less

weeks before the election, the law did not give the commission power to ensure that the
was free and fair. He conceded that there was little the commission could do
unfair
coverage of the opposition parties by the state-owned Kenya Broadcasting
about

election

Corporation. 7
It is

therefore not surprising that the provincial administration continued as

amendments had not been passed

stronghold, the Keiyo district commissioner
nity to vote

KANU in

is

if

the

province, President Moi's

at all. In the Rift Valley

reported to have urged the local

commu-

the following words:

As [I am] an employee of Kanu government, my livelihood depends on the very
same system. Therefore I would not shy away from praying that President Moi be
re-elected once more, to enable me to remain the DC.
Better the devil you are
used to than the angel you do not know. It is scary to hear of these parties who
usually claim that once they take over power from Kanu, they would dismantle the
.

.

.

provincial administration and clip off powers of the police.

Who

will entertain

that? 8

Most of the officials in provincial administration would have been of the same opinion.
The determination to retain their jobs under the "devil you are used to" certainly ranked
much higher than any hypothetical ideas of commitment to democracy and fair play.
Thus, confronted with a powerless Electoral Commission, the actual process of managing the election remained in their hands.

And

1992 when President Moi did just enough
outcome was never in serious doubt. The idea

so, just as in

to legitimate the elec-

were
was one that was widely accepted in the runup to the election. It would seem that not much had changed during the previous five years. Indeed,
the democracy experiment in Kenya demonstrates that it is possible to have multiparty

toral process, the

that the elections

unlikely to be free and fair

elections every five years without changing anything.

The Election Results
Largely owing to a divided opposition, the incumbent president was returned to office

on a minority vote and the ruling party gained a slim majority in the newly elected
Parliament. As in the 1992 election, ethnic mobilization emerged as a central feature of
the democratization experiment in Kenya.

controversial;

more

significantly, the

The electoral process was flawed and highly
outcome was divisive and highly prone to the

influence of ethnic separatism.

76

To understand
purposes of

this

this necessitates a brief analysis of the

1997 elections

the following criteria: political parties that have

more than

and whose presidential candidates were seen or perceived
the presidency (see Table

Table

results.

For

examination, the main political players have been selected according to
ten

members

Parliament

in

be serious contenders for

to

1).

1

The 1997 Kenya Elections:
Distribution of Seats by Province

KANU
Nairobi

NDPK

DP

1

5

Coast

18

2

North-Eastern
Eastern

14

_FiK]

1

9
8

1

17

Central
Rift Valley

39

Western
Nyanza

5

7

3
9

8

4
17

9

104

10

1

15

Total

SDP

1

39

21

16

Source: Compiled from Electoral Commission of Kenya, Parliamentary Election Results,
January 1998.
Note;

KANU: Kenya

African National Union; DP: Democratic Party, NDPK; National
for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), Kenya;

Democratic Party of Kenya; F(K): Forum
SDP: Social Democratic Party.

To

one must understand the ethnic composi-

situate the election results in perspective,

Kenya has more than forty ethnic groups ranging in number
from a few hundred to several million. The three largest ethnic groups are Kikuyu (21
percent), Luhya (14 percent), and Luo (13.5 percent). They occupy three distinct provinces, Central, Nyanza, and Western, respectively. Three districts in Nyanza are occupied by the Bantu Kuria and Gusii (5 percent) who have ten seats between them. The
Luhya of the Western province, however, do not constitute one homogeneous ethnic
group. The Luhya is, in fact, a combination of sixteen different subethnic groups
Bukusu, Idakho, Isukha, Kabras, Khayo, Kisa, Marama, Maragoli, Marachi, Banyala,
tion of Kenya's provinces.

—

Banyore, Samia, Techoni,

Tiriki, Tsotso,

tion into rival subethnic groups explains

and Wanga.

why

It is

believed that this segmenta-

the Western province has never voted as a

do its Luo neighbors or the Kikuyu of Central province.
The Kamba (11 percent) occupy the Eastern province, which they share with
Meru Tharaka (5 percent). The Rift Valley province is occupied by the Kalenjin
single bloc as

percent), the Masai, Turkana,

Samburu,

Kikuyu "immigrants," those who

Iteso (5 percent),

the
(11

and a large population of

settled in the province as a result of colonial land

dispossession at the beginning of the century and are often referred to as the Kikuyu
diaspora.

It is

also important to point out that the Kalenjin do not comprise a single

ethnic croup but like the

—

Luhya

are a combination of several Nilotic subethnic groups

Kipsigis, Nandi, Pokot, Elgeyo,

Marakwet, Keiyo, Tugen, Sabaot, Dorobo, and

77

New England Journal

of Public Policy

form what is generally known as the Kalenjin. 9
Taveta, Pokomo,
The Coast province is occupied by a number of ethnic groups
which together constitute about 6 percent of the total
Swahili, Bajun, and Mjikenda
population. Mombasa, the provincial capital, is metropolitan with substantial represenKikuyu, Luhya, Luo, and Kamba. As a metropolitan capital,
tation from the big four
the Nairobi province is predominantly composed of ethnic groups with the highest instances of proletarianization. The balance, however, is skewed heavily in favor of the
Kikuyu, which explains why they have traditionally dominated the parliamentary seats
in Nairobi. In fact the Kikuyu almost seem to regard Nairobi as "theirs."
Terik. Together they

—

—

—

Given the ethnic composition of the

political parties, the patterns of ethnic support

are very easy to identify. Just as in 1992, Table

shows, the ruling party Kenya African

1

National Union victory represented an alliance of the minority ethnic groups

— Coast,

North-Eastern, Eastern, Rift Valley, Western provinces, and eight seats from the Kuria

and Kisii of Nyanza.
seat),

KANU

and Luo Nyanza (no

was

virtually locked out of Nairobi (one seat), Central (no

seat). It is

elections, areas of minority ethnic

relation to their populations.

equally significant to observe that as in the 1992

groups had proportionately more constituencies in

Thus Nairobi province, with a registered voter population

of around 680,000, had only eight parliamentary seats compared with North-Eastern's

142,000 for ten seats; Eastern province has thirty-two seats to Central's twenty-five for
almost the same number of voting population. 10 This clearly demonstrates the uneven
nature of the playing field.
In the absence of

Kenneth Matiba's FORD-Asili

party, the

Democratic Party's

Mwai

Kibaki emerged as the authentic Kikuyu candidate. Matiba had argued for a boycott of
the elections unless fundamental reforms

were put

voters roll, thereby disqualifying himself

from standing and from voting

tions.

This led FORD-Asili to

split in

in place

and refused

to register in the
in the elec-

two, with Martin Shikuku, the secretary-general,

FORD-Asili name and Kimani wa Nyoike, a Matiba supporter,
FORD-People. Matiba denounced both factions, thereby denying them a

retaining the original
registering as

reasonable chance of garnering electoral support.

Kibaki collected five of the eight seats in Nairobi, seventeen of the Kikuyu seats in
Central province including five from the

Kikuyu diaspora and eight from Eastern prov-

Menu and Embu sections of the Eastern province. Thus
the old Gikuyu Menu Embu Alliance (GEMA) held on rather well. Following the split
within the former official opposition, FORD-Kenya, Kijana Wamalwa's FORD-K, and
Raila Odinga's National Development Party of Kenya (NDPK) were reduced to Bukusu
ince, but, notably, only

from the

was able to exclude KANU and other parties from
but two seats. The eight seats from the Kuria and
Kisii districts of Nyanza went to KANU and FORD-K. Wamalwa, however, was unable
to do the same in Western province and lost fifteen seats to KANU, but he did get two
seats from the Luo heartland, that is, Ugenya and Gem in Siaya district, and two from
South and West Mugirango in Kisii district.
Thus of Raila's (NDPK ) twenty-one seats, nineteen came from Nyanza and one each

and Luo
the

parties, respectively. Raila

Luo Nyanza

picking, winning

all

from Nairobi and Central provinces. Wamalwa's

FORD-K

was represented in at least
The other new party, Charity Ngilu's and Professor Peter Anyang-Nyongo's Social Democratic Party (SDP), was
able to collect ten seats in Ukambani as was expected, but was a disappointment in
Kiambu in the Central province where it had been expected to collect the Matiba vote.
It nonetheless managed to get five seats from Kiambu and one from Nairobi, but, of
four provinces

— Nyanza, Western,

Rift Valley, and Eastern.
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more

significance,

none from Nyanza, where the parly

aged only a third place

These figures are more or

Once

again,

KANU's

Kisumu

in the

leader, Professor

less replicated in the presidential vote as

President

Nyongo, man-

rural constituency.

Moi had

shown

in

Table

solid support in minority regions with

more

2.

than 61 percent in the Coast province, 73 percent in the North-Eastern province, and 69

percent in the Rift Valley province.

He

also

Western province and more than 35 percent
25 percent

in five provinces requirement.

managed
in the

a comfortable 44.67 percent in the

Eastern province, easily meeting the

Kibaki managed to get 25 percent or more in

only three provinces; his best showing was in Central province

where he garnered more than 88 percent of the votes. The

among

the Kikuyu,

rest of the candidates

were

Wamalwa garnered only 48 percent in his own backyard in
Ngilu won 32.35 percent in her Eastern province, and Raila did

"one-province" candidates.

Western Kenya; Charity
slightly better at

popular appeal

56.55 percent in Nyanza

cent of the vote in

Nyanza

— he

certainly lacked the clout to better the

won 75 perBoth the 1992 and 1997 elections

Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, exerted when he

his late father,

in the

1992

elections.

confirm the overwhelming centrality of ethnicity in political mobilization.
This voting pattern represents a trend that has been observable in Kenya throughout
its thirty-six

years of political independence, that

Table 2

Province

Nairobi

Coast

is,

ethnic mobilization for control of

The 1997 Kenya General Elections:
Presidential Vote by Province
Moi

Kibaki

Raila

Kijan

Ngilu

KANU

D P

NDPK

FORDK

SDP
39,707

75,272

160,124

59,415

24,971

20.56%

44%

16.23%

6.82%

10.85%

229,084

50,540

22,794

11,156

37,600

2.97%
4418
7.00%

366

0.58%

61.05%

13.4%

North-

46,121

11,741

Eastem

73.08%

18.60%

6.07%
210
0.33%

Eastern

368,801

296,262

7,755

7,009

332,578

35.87%

28.81%

0.75%

0.68%

55,822

885,382

6,812

3,067

0.31%

32.35%
29A73
2.95%

Central

10.02%

5.59%

88.73%

0.68%

Rift-

140,109

343,529

36,022

102,178

11,345

Valley

69%

20.90%

6.22%

0.69%

314,669

9,755

44.67%

1.38%

2.19%
13A58
1.91%

Western

Nyanza

Total

Source:

338,120

3,429

48.00%

0.49%

215,923

138,194

519,259

14,623

15,309

23.52%

15.05%

56.55%

1.59%

1.57%

1,895,527

665,725

505,542

469,907

2,445,801

Weekly Review, January

9,

1998.

Note: The other candidates were: Martin Shikuku (FORD-Asili), Katama Mkangi (Kenya National
Congress), George Anyona (Kenya Social Congress), Kimani wa Nyoike (FORD-People). Koigi
wa Wamwere (Kenya National Democratic Alliance), Munywa Waiyaki (United Patriotic Party of
Kenya), Godfrey Mwireria (Green Africa Party), Wangari Mathai (Economiclndependence
Party ), David Waweru Ng.ethe (Umma Patriotic Party).
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state power.

Policy

During the short-lived multiparty period from 1963

to the "Little

General

Election" of 1966, the personalities and the parties were different but the voting patterns

were strikingly similar

the then opposition party,

dent

Moi and

to the last

two multiparty

elections.

It

his present coalition

were leading

figures,

drew

its

Oginga Odinga

(KANU)

then headed by

drew

as his deputy,

its

be recalled that

in

which

Presi-

support mainly from

the Coast and Rift Valley provinces and parts of Western province.

African National Union

will

Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU),

The

Jomo Kenyatta with

ruling

Kenya

the late Jaramogi

support from Central, Nyanza, Nairobi, and East-

when Odinga walked out of the
Kenya People Union (KPU), the KPU failed to
cultivate a presence outside Odinga's Luo base in Nyanza, and in the ensuing Little
General Election, all except one of the KPU MPs came from Odinga's Luo stronghold
ern provinces and parts of Western province. In 1966,

ruling party to found his short-lived

in

Nyanza.

The following discussion considers

the implications that can be inferred

from these

events for democratization in Kenya.

Ethnicization of Political Contestation

The Kenyan experience represents a case of a "ruling class" determined to hold on to
power at all costs. The key question however is, What makes it behave in this
particular manner? The argument has been presented elsewhere that in order to understand the roots of political crisis and obstacles to democratization in Kenya, we must
political

focus attention on the character of the post-colonial state in Kenya, particularly

forms of accumulation over the past

thirty years or so,

its

and the character of the class

forces which have traditionally controlled the state and,

more important, how power has

been mediated. 11

The premise

is

that politics

about the conscious processes of sorting out contesta-

is

and negotiations

tion over resources, cooperation,
tion of resources,

and the inevitable disputes

in the use, production,

arising

and

distribu-

from calculations about winners

and losers. 12 In Kenya these processes have historically been regulated by authoritarian
means mediated through mobilized ethnicity. These ethnic identities were constructed
under colonialism and bequeathed
entirety.

The post-colonial

state,

incoming independent

to the

state

however, went a step further, for

it

almost in their

ethnicized political

contestation precisely because this

was the only medium through which the new

could best consolidate

power.

its

political

Another form of colonial legacy
centrality of the state in

economic

that

elite

was reproduced in post-colonial Kenya is the
and particularly the role of the state as the

activity

driver of the process of accumulation, easily the largest single dispenser of patronage

and resources. The colonial
institution

was

state

central in the sense that

it

was

the only organized

capable of guaranteeing the reproduction of the conditions of colonial accu-

mulation. Precisely the

same

role

was

to

control of the state or proximity to those

be assumed by the post-colonial

who had

access to state power

state.

became

Hence
the

main preoccupation of politics. Yes, politics is generally about control of (state) power.
The point, however, is that in societies characterized by an uneven development of
of production, ethnic inequalities of the type that characterize
Kenya, and high instances of extra-economic coercion, are all political activity centers
around gaining control of the state.

capitalist relations

This has been the major defining characteristic of Kenyan politics over the entire
period of

its

independence.

And

precisely because of the uneven development of

80

commodity

relations,

made upon

claims

which

in the

context of Kenya means ethnic inequalities, the

the state have been in sharp conflict. Contestation over resources has

increasingly assumed the form of ethnic competition, thus creating

ground for

fertile

the reconstruction of ethnic identities and ethnicization of political contestation.

Thus
dium of

became

not surprising that ethnicity increasingly

it is

political mobilization.

the

most important me-

Successive regimes in Kenya constructed class power

along ethnicized identities, and resources have been contested along similar

makes

distribution of land and, to
ties.

13

Bates

lines.

the mistake of reducing the post-independence ethnic contestation solely to the

The

some

struggles between

the rivalries between the

degree, misses the class character of ethnicized identi-

KANU, KADU,

Luo and Kikuyu

intra- Kikuyu rivalry in the

later

KANU

dying days of the Kenyatta regime

mon: ethnic and subethnic mobilization
sumption that the

and

and KPU,

in the 1960s,

ethnic groups throughout the 1970s, and the

had one thing

all

for control of the post-colonial state.

economic development and

state is the central player in

com-

in

The

as-

distribution

of resources underpinned this contestation for state power. This remained the case in the

immediate post-independence decade, and

continues to underpin political practice

it

even now, notwithstanding the seemingly almost universal triumph of "market funda-

mentalism" during the course of the past

fifteen years.

So the main difference between the Kenyatta and the Moi regimes has been the
greater degree and intensity of kleptocracy under the latter. It is important to emphasize
this point because some literature has tended to paint a glowing picture of Kenyatta
while demonizing Moi. 14 But to fully understand the significance for democratization, it
important to situate Moi's kleptocratic regime in context, namely, the international
economic environment within which it emerged and of course the particular classlike
is

elements that constitute the ruling coalition.
President Moi's

new

alliance, particularly the coalition

aftermath of the 1982 coup attempt, was a relatively

he cobbled together

weak economic

class.

in the

Unlike the

Kenyatta coalition, which had constituted the most prominent pre-colonial and colonial

exponents of primitive accumulation, the Moi coalition
tively

initially

comprised a compara-

impoverished alliance from areas of the country where capitalism had made the

least penetration.

15

Moi's

first

task

was

base for his coalition. In

to construct a capital

the absence of fresh areas of accumulation, Moi's embryonic accumulators

pelled to "loot" from the old accumulators

new

coalition had to be constructed

Kikuyu

capital.

Bates
involved

lists

in,

a

or,

as

Ngunyi puts

upon the dissolution of

it,

were com-

the capital base of the

the already entrenched

16

number of forms of "primitive accumulation"

that this alliance

was

but also points out that a sizable element was pure predation, a transfer of

agricultural surpluses to favored regions, particularly the Rift Valley and sections of the

Western province. 17 Clearly, the capture of
the distribution of patronage and resources

power enabled President Moi to shift
away from the Kikuyu to "disadvantaged

state

ethnic groups" previously marginalized by the Kenyatta coalition

nomic and
list

political grievances against that coalition.

who bore

real eco-

This period constituted the popu-

phase of Moi's regime.
Ultimately, patronage and resources

own

came

to

be concentrated around President Moi's

ethnic group, the Kalenjin in general and the

coincided, as

it

1982 coup attempt. Furthermore, Moi
tion of public

Tugen

in particular.

This process

were, with the consolidation of his coalition in the aftermath of the
like Kenyatta completely politicized the alloca-

and private investments: roads, educational

57

infrastructure,

and agricultural
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investments were directed mainly toward Moi's own political constituency. The new
power was self-consciously a Kalenjin power, and institutions previously dominated by
the Kikuyu were Kalenjinized. Access to university education and to employment in
state parastatals depended on whether one was recognized by the government as a
member of the KANU tribe. This type of distribution of resources and the crude use of
the state for primitive accumulation could only be predicated on authoritarian control.

Not

Moi abandon

for nothing did

the practice of ethno-regional balancing that

had

provided a veneer of political legitimation and stability for the Kenyatta regime.

More

important, however,

kleptocratic bourgeoisie

is that this

system of primitive accumulation fostered a

whose existence and

survival

tinued access to this type of authoritarian state.
in

It is

depended very much on

1992 with prospects of an open political process and a situation

tutions

might have

to

be subjected

defend

class sought to

its

interests

to greater public scrutiny

most

in full.

most notably
story of the

The

parts of

which

state insti-

and accountability,

brutal ethnic conflict,

marks of contemporary ethnic cleansing going on

The

con-

this

through mobilized ethnicity. In the runup to the 1992

elections, the country witnessed the

places,

in

its

when confronted

not surprising that

in other

which bore

all

the hall-

more highly publicized

former Yugoslavia.

1992 ethnic cleansing

in the Rift Valley

province has yet to be told

available evidence, however, suggests that the killer bands, recruited mainly

from the Kalenjin and Masai supporters of the ruling party, were encouraged by top
officials

of the ruling party and the government, with the explicit project of expelling

so-called foreigners from the province.

18

Once

again, in the

runup

to the

similarly orchestrated violence occurred in the Coast province, parts of
Rift Valley province.

As

1997 elections,

Nyanza, and the

indicated above, apart from undermining the demographic

strength of the opposition parties in the areas affected, this kind of ethnic cleansing, of

stoking further violence and political destabilization,
cal concessions
level. It is

from the center by those

indeed the

first

who

is

also designed to extract politi-

are unable to

compete at the national
which in South Africa, for

step toward warlordism, a strategy

example, Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party put to very good use in the runup to the
country's first-ever democratic elections in 1994.

Obviously, in accumulation regimes of this type the dominant tendency in politics
bound to be an inclination toward authoritarian control. This was true of the colonial
state, whose legacy of an emphasis on exerting control has been reproduced in the postcolonial era quite uncritically, but understandably so, from the point of view of the class
forces that have dominated the state since independence. Some commentators have
suggested that a major obstacle to democratization in Kenya now is not so much this
is

class disposition but, instead,

unite and field only

simply the tactical failure of the opposition parties to

one candidate. To the extent that

mocratization with just the removal of President
flawed.

The

this

view appears

Moi from

office,

it is

issue of identifying a single candidate to stand against

rated from the

much wider

issues of democratic principles, not

While a united opposition would certainly bring an end
African National Union misrule, whether

to

equate de-

fundamentally

Moi should be

mere

sepa-

personalities.

to the long period

of Kenya

would engender democracy remains highly
debatable. The question that needs to be addressed is why opposition unity remained
illusory over the last seven years. The answer is that the opposition, just like the ruling
it

KANU, is constructed around ethnic identities and has contested political power
on the basis of mobilized ethnicity. Thus it is unlikely to usher in a new and more principled discourse and praxis of politics.
party
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It

be recalled that the Kenyan opposition

will

sented a fragile alliance of

at its reconstitution in

two main tendencies. The

first

capital and property, predominantly but not exclusively the

nized into

1992 repre-

represented the old classes of

Kikuyu bourgeoisie,

orga-

two antagonistic camps. One of them, the Matiba camp (FORD-Asili), repre-

sented the fraction which had occupied the second

tier

of the old Kenyatta coalition and

regarded themselves as the true representatives of the Kikuyu rank and
the support of the

Kikuyu diaspora

Kiambu and Muranga

Nakuru, and Molo

in Laikipia,

and more important,

in Nairobi

file.

They had

of the Central province of Kenya, the

districts

districts

of the Rift Valley province,

and some of the major towns. Matiba's

tactical alliance

992 not only gave him a national image, but, more
significantly, represented a potential alliance of the two of the largest ethnic groups, the
Luhya and the Kikuyu. The Kibaki camp (Democratic Party), in contrast, represented
with Martin Shikuku (Luhya) in

1

the hegemonic fraction of the old Kenyatta coalition, the elite of the old

Nyeri counterparts, which for

Kiambu

bour-

must have appeared
as the true representatives of the Kikuyu ethnic group. This group did not do so well in
1992, coming third with 1.03 million votes in the presidential race. But in 1997 and
with Matiba out of the race, the Democratic Party emerged as the true Kikuyu party.
The other tendency of course was the old radical petite bourgeoisie of the mainstream Kenyan opposition of the late Jaramogi Oginga Odinga's FORD-Kenya. The

geoisie and

its

all

practical purposes

comprised the old radical traditional opposition, the professional intellectual

latter

middle

classes, the so-called

Young Turks, and other

much around Odinga and

very

Bukusu subsection of
1992

the

Luo

as

forces that had been active in the

it was a coalition that was
power base, with the support of the

struggle for democratization throughout the 1980s.
its

But

the Luhya, a fact reflected in Odinga's electoral support in the

contest.

Following Odinga's death

The long

rivalry

FORD-Kenya
itself as the

between

in

1994, the party leadership passed to

Wamalwa and

party,

its

base

and

finally, original

among

these considerations-

all

NDPK, which

was control of

state

ruled out any possibilities of a temporary alliance between the

Thus by

their

to

power. The two Kikuyu

and the Odinga faction

main opposition

parties.

be the case during the 1997 election.

own

have demonstrated

political practices

that they are

the main stem from which
ties since

sought

the Luhya.

imbalances of the previous period. These considerations obviously

to redress the

The same seemed

for the

FORD, which now

factions needed the state to recapture old areas of accumulation,

needed

Kijana.

reconstituted

Nyongo's SDP, which was seen mainly as the platform

predominantly to reconstitute

At the core of

Wamalwa

Odinga's son, Raila, ultimately culminated in

disintegrating in three directions: Raila' s

Luo

presidential candidacy of Charity Ngilu,

ers

built

1992 has nothing

not

over the

much

last

seven years, the opposition lead-

different

from

KANU,

which indeed

is

all

of them have emerged. The proliferation of political par-

to

do with principles or ideological differences. Rather it is
among a group that is capable of

motivated by political greed and personal ambitions
mobilizing ethnic constituencies

ment

for their

own

who have genuine

personal political goals.

It

grievances against a central govern-

follows that the assumption that a united

opposition would offer a fundamentally different alternative political force and
brighter future for democratization in

Kenya

requires serious reconsideration.
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The Role

Policy

of the International Financial

and the Donor Community

Institutions

The use of Western

promote democratization has been one of the main features of
it was the intervention of Western

aid to

democratic transition

sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed,

in

November 1991 that finally persuaded President
number of scholars have questioned the motives of
institutions (IFIs) and donor community and the simultaneous

governments and donor agencies

Moi

to

concede

political space.

the international financial

in

A

application of seemingly contradictory structural adjustment programs and political
conditionalities to

promote democracy. For example,

it

has been argued that structural

adjustment programs have a tendency to undermine sovereignty and create authoritarian

regimes which are increasingly compelled to implement an antidemocratic

economic reforms. Barya,

for instance, argues that the

new

have nothing to do with the Western countries' commitment
instead, he sees

macy

it

as an attempt

capitalist

system

in the

to

of socio-

encouraging democracy;

by the most powerful countries

for the grossly unequal distribution of

set

political conditionalities

to create a

power and resources

new

legiti-

in the international

post-Cold War order. 19

The Kenyan experience would seem to confirm some of these doubts and skepticism.
The stance taken by the IFIs and donor community with respect to the transition process
in Kenya has been hypocritical, contained double standards, and quite blatantly impeded the chances of democratization. Indeed, following the 1997 Kenyan election we
cannot now say with any certainty what the West and its agencies mean by democracy,
good governance, and transparency. For the IFIs and bilateral donors quickly reestablished business-as-usual relations with the Moi regime after the 1992 election. That was
notwithstanding the facts that the election was visibly flawed, that the newly elected
government was largely unaccountable, that the human rights record had hardly improved, and all at a time when state-instigated ethnic cleansing had clearly been unleashed on Kikuyu residents in the Rift Valley province. Donor agencies and their respective governments appeared to exhibit more concern about the pace of macroeconomic reform, economic liberalization, and accountability to the IFIs than democratic political progress.

away with
long as

it

economy
with

little

kept
is

Throughout the past

five years, the

regime has been able

to get

kinds of political abuses, including fresh outbursts of ethnic cleansing as

all

its

macroeconomic reforms on

track.

probably one of the most liberalized

in

The

result is that the

Kenyan

sub-Saharan Africa, unfortunately

corresponding political liberalization.

Of course,

the donors did intervene in the runup to the general election in

August

1997, once the political mobilization which started with the Limuru Convention had

culminated

in yet

another Saba Saba and as the crowd once again briefly reentered the

political ring. Radical opposition

members and

their allies in the National

Executive Council seemed capable of capturing the political

initiative,

Convention

threatening to

make Kenya ungovernable and create political instability. And as happened once before,
President Moi was pressured to concede reform; and just as on the previous occasion,
the reforms

were modest

in practice but served to legitimate the electoral process in the

eyes of the world. Only a few days after his electoral victory,
that has consistently struck a favorable

businessmen
investor

on

its

at the

[sic],

Moi

returned to a theme

chord with the donor community. Addressing

Nairobi Stock Exchange, he said, "I want to assure Kenyans and

both local and foreign, that the government places economic growth high

agenda ... the

stability

of macro-economic environment

.

.

.

would be assured

as

20
a prerequisite for attracting, investment."

A

week

later the

London Club of

foreign

creditors agreed to reschedule the external debt arrears that had soared to U.S.
million. That

same week

the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) mission was

and expressed optimism about the country's
ment, Gadwall Gondwe,

is

future.

The IMF

$560
town

in

director for Africa Depart-

quoted as having said that the fund was "keen on ensuring"

that Kenya returns swiftly to economic stability. The country, he asserted, had broadly
met the conditions on good governance and anticorruption.
Around the same time a European Union delegation in Nairobi issued a statement
saying that the threat to suspend aid to Kenya was now lifted; it was quoted as saying,
"The two sides had agreed on a new measure under which the funds would be disbursed
long-standing cooperation between the two sides would continue, notwithstanding
the shortcomings of a general election which the EU described as a step further toward
Kenya's full democratization." 21 And the Japanese government offered to Moi's government a grant of KShs 188 million to be spent on the health sector. The Japanese ambassador, Dr. Shinsuke Horiuchi, is reported to have said that "his government was happy
to note Kenya's commitment to addressing various governance issues such as greater
-22
transparency, better management of public expenditures, and combating corruption.
This in the aftermath of one of the most flawed electoral processes that the country has
.

.

.

witnessed since

it

attained political independence thirty-six years ago.

So another controversial election, another round of ethnic cleansing. But as far as
donor community and the IFIs are concerned, it is business as usual. The transition

the

process, they argue, constitutes a step in the right direction. In the light of this evidence

Barya's contention that the

commitment by Western
after

new

have nothing to do with a
democracy is not so very far-fetched

political condilionalities

countries to encouraging

all.

The Kenyan experience raises several interesting and interrelated questions for the democratization process. The first of these concerns the enduring ethnic pluralism. A
political process that

can exclude up to 65 percent of the electorate from the political

center stage does not bode well for either democracy or long-term political stability.

Ultimately

it

can only survive by way of some form of authoritarianism, more so in the

context of Kenya, where

groups who perceive

The danger of a

among

the people

that they are so

debilitating ethnic

who

are excluded are substantial ethnic

excluded precisely because of their ethnic identity.

war

is

one very possible outcome of

this

type of

dispensation.

Second,

it is

an established view in

much

of the political science literature on post-

colonial Africa that the "first-past-the-post" electoral system, inherited from Britain's

Westminster parliamentary model of independence, seems

economics of the Kenyan

type. In societies

whose

political

to

be unsuited

power

is

to political

hotly contested

along lines of ethnic cleavages, an electoral system that allows the winner by a minority
vote to take

all is

simply a recipe for disaster. The winning party

undemocratic means

Kenyan

to protect its gains

situation has not

exploded

that direction, unless of course a

To

this extent, therefore,

it

and

is

tempted

to resort to

try to legitimate its political control.

yet, but recent

The

developments certainly are pushing

in

workable power-sharing formula can be found.

can be argued that one of the more positive outcomes of

the last two electoral exercises

is

a clear

message

85

to opposition parties that

no single

.
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ethnic group can

Policy

win on

its

own.

KANU's

victory has been possible precisely because

of astute deployment of state patronage to cobble together a minority alliance

that,

The
more inclusive political system cannot be overemphasized. Perhaps the time
has come for a more serious consideration to be given to the merits of democratic federrightly or wrongly, fears the perceived domination of the majority ethnic groups.

need

for a

alism. Unfortunately, in

much of sub-Saharan

Africa attempts to introduce constitu-

accommodate ethnic diversity have not yet been particularly successbecause political autonomy has often been manipulated to pursue sectarian

tional reforms to
ful precisely

interests.

A

third

and equally important question relates

to the overall character of the political

two multiparty elections, can we genuinely say that something fundamental has changed in Kenya? It could be argued that the Moi regime has
very much succeeded in narrowing the political space which was pried open with the
system

in

Kenya

today. After

reforms of 1990. Political repression has not abated: yes, detention without

been brought

to

an end, but as a local lawyer and

activist put

it,

trial

has

political activism

has

increasingly been criminalized. In the meantime, the judicial system has remained un-

der the tight control of the ruling
its

protected officials seems

edented

levels,

elite,

bound

and any

to fail.

legal action against the

and the police and other security apparatuses of the

been transformed into the armed thugs of the ruling

community appears
democratization. **

cry from what the donor

Kenya's

full

government or

Meanwhile, corruption has reached unprecparty. All of

state

which

have almost

is

certainly a far

to perceive as a transitional step

toward
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